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affected the judgment of the jury." 66 In applying this test to the facts, the
court found that there was no "reasonable probability" that the "potentially false testimony" regarding Kirchheimer's involvement with drugs
and alcohol affected the jury'sjudgment. The courtreasoned that thejury
heard quite a bit of evidence regarding Kirchheimer's past, including her
arrest record for drugs and prostitution.
It is unclear exactly what effect the decision in Pope will have on
future cases in which prisoners allege that the government knowingly
used perjured testimony to obtain a conviction. It bears mention,
however, that the Supreme Court has, on several occasions held that "a
State may not knowingly use ... false testimony to obtain a tainted
conviction." 67 Further, this principle applies even if "the false testimony
goes only to the credibility of the witness."' 68 In Pope, Kirchheimer's
66

Pope, 113 F.3d at 1371 (quoting UnitedStates v. Kelly, 35 F.3d
929, 933 (4th Cir. 1994)). This test seems to favor the Commonwealth,
as it did in this situation, to a significant degree.
67
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). See UnitedStates v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).

allegedly false testimony regarding her use of alcohol that night bore
directly on her credibility; however, the court of appeals determined that
there was no "reasonable probability" that it affected the jury.
The court's decision on this issue should be an important lesson to
defense counsel: counsel should attempt to follow every lead and
investigate every issue which is practicable, especially when a witness
gives questionable testimony. It is also important, as always, for
attorneys to make their objections as early in the proceedings as possible
in order to avoid the dreaded procedural bar in subsequent proceedings.
Summary and Analysis by:
Brian S. Clarke

68Id.

SMITH v. ANGELONE
111 F.3d 1126 (4th Cir. 1997)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On July 24, 1988, Roy Bruce Smith drank approximately fourteen
beers between2:30p.m. and 8:30p.m. Mr. Smithwasupsetby his wife's
failure to invite him to her company picnic as well as other indications
that she might have left him. Shortly after 8:30 p.m. Mr. Smith went to
sit on his front porch armed with a .357 magnum, a .44 magnum, and an
assault rifle with a bayonet attached. 1 At 8:45 p.m., Mr. Smith's nextdoor neighbor, Mr. Cottrell, saw Mr. Smith sitting on the frontporch. Mr.
Smith told Cottrell that his wife had left him and "that he was 'not going
to make it through the night." 2 While Mr. Smith and Mr. Cottrell talked,
Mr. Smith fired a shot in the air, and, a few minutes later, fired a couple
shots in the general direction of two kids across the street who had set off
some fireworks. 3 Saying he "had enough",Mr. Cottrell wentback inside
his home to which Mr. Smith replied, "I hope somebody calls the police
because I'll shoot the first one that arrives and I hope they shoot me in
return. ' 4 Another neighbor, Mr. Wood, remonstrated Mr. Smith for
firing his gun. As Mr. Wood walked away, Mr. Smith said that he was
waiting for somebody to call the police and that "I'll probably shoot the
first one that I see."' 5 Mr. Wood called the police and warned them that
Mr. Smith was armed.
Around 9:00 p.m. several police officers arrived but parked where
their vehicles would not arouse Mr. Smith's suspicions. Officer Anderson saw Mr. Smith sitting on the front porch and told the dispatcher to

1 Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 248-49, 389 S.E.2d 871,
873 (1990).
2
1d. at 249, 389 S.E.2d at 873.
3
1d., 389 S.E.2d at 874.
4
1d.
5Id.
6 Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. at 250, 389 S.E.2d at 874.

'6
"[h]ave a unit cruise around.., to the rear of the townhouses." This
order was relayed to Sgt. John Conner, a uniformed officer, who was en
route. At this point, Mr. Smith, who was still out front, suddenly got up
and went inside when "some person... started across the street." 7 A few
moments later Sgt. Conner radioed that, "I've got him in sight he's
coming out the back door." 8 Other officers headed to the back of Mr.
Smith's house. One of the officers, James K. Ryan, heard Sgt. Conner
say, "[d]rop the rifle, drop the rifle now," followed by gunfire consisting
of eight to twelve sharp cracks, a short pop, and then more sharp cracks. 9
Officer Ryan found Sgt. Conner lying on the ground in the alleyway.
Officer Steven Bamford found Mr. Smith crouching down next to the
back deck with the rifle across his lap. Officer Bamford got Mr. Smith
to drop his rifle, but he refused to comply with Officer Bamford's order
to put his hands on the ground, walk out, and lay flat. A struggle ensued
as several officers tried to take the rifle and the two revolvers away from
him. During the struggle he requested that the officers "[g]o ahead and
kill [him]." 10 After Mr. Smith was handcuffed and placed in leg
restraints he said "that Conner was the 'first priority, take care of him,
take care of him. He's one of us, one of ours." ' 11 Sgt. Conner died
several hours later. Although sustaining several wounds, it was a head
12
wound that proved to be fatal.
Mr. Smith was convicted of the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a law enforcement officer for the purpose of interfering

7Id.
81d.
91d.
10 Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. at 251, 389 S.E.2d at 875
(alteration in original).
111d.
12 Id.
13 This section has been changed to Virginia Code section 18.231(6).
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with the performance of his official duties under Virginia Code section
18.2-31(f). 13 The jury found that the Commonwealth had proven both
vileness and future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt and
sentenced Mr. Smith to death. The trial court entered the sentence on
May 26, 1989.14 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
16
and sentence. 15 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Mr. Smith filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in state court, which
was dismissed on August 19, 1991.17 He appealed, unsuccessfully, to
the Virginia Supreme Court. 18 The United States Supreme Court again
denied certiorari. 19 He next petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in
federalcourt under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. OnJune 10,1996, the districtcourt
denied the writ. 20 Mr. Smith then appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit raising four issues, including: (1) that his trial counsel
was constitutionally ineffective in failing to seek the appointment of nonpsychiatric experts; and (2) that the district court erred in finding his
21
federal constitutional claims procedurally barred.
HOLDING
22
The Court ofAppeals affirmed the district court's denial ofrelief.

ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

At trial Mr. Smith's defense was essentially that he did not know
that Sgt. Conner was a police officer and fired his gun only after he was
first
shotinthe footby someonehe couldnot see. Hetestifiedthathe fired
only his rifle and denied shooting Sgt. Conner in the back ofthe head with
his .357 magnum. The Commonwealth elicited testimony from three
"experts" to establish that Mr. Smith shot Sgt. Conner in the back of the
head at close range with his .357 magnum. Mr. Smith's trial counsel
attempted to undercut this expert testimony through cross-examination.
On federal habeas Mr. Smith alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
due to his trial counsel's decision to rely solely on cross-examination
23
rather than to seek the appointment of experts.
Mr. Smith presented expert testimony to establish that he did not
shoot Sgt. Conner in the back of the head with his .357 magnum. The
court of appeals stated that "[e]ven in hindsight, and with the help of a
battery of experts, Smith was not able to prove much more at the habeas
14

Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1997).
15 Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 389 S.E.2d 871 (1990).
16
Smith v. Virginia,498 U.S. 881 (1990).
17 Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d at 1128.
18
Id.
19 Smith v. Virginia,506 U.S. 848 (1992).
20 Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d at 1128.
21 Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d at 1131, 1133. Smith's other two
claims, that the newly enacted informapauperisfiling fee provisions of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act apply to habeas proceedings and that
the district court's denial of Smith's motion to amend his habeas petition
was an abuse of discretion, will not be discussed in this summary.
22
1d.at 1128.
23 The court notes that there was uncertainty on appeal over whether
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's ("AEDPA") new
evidentiary standard for habeas corpus actions, as contained in Title I of
that Act, should be applied in this case. The court did not answer that
uncertainty. Instead, it decided that even under the more expansive prior
scope ofreview, Smith was not entitled to relief. Id.at 1131 n. 2. Defense
counsel should be aware that for the next few years courts will be
wrestling with this uncertainty as to when AEDPA takes effect on habeas
petitions and should be on the lookout for when it does.

hearing than his lawyers did at trial." 24 The court then, in typical
Strickland25 language, concluded, "Smith's lawyers made a tactical
decision to rely on [the state's firearm expert] and other prosecution
experts to dispute the prosecution's theory, and we cannot say in
'26
hindsight that this was an unreasonable tactic."
While the court's first statement, that the testimony of Mr. Smith's
experts did notprove much more than his lawyers did at trial, is arguable,
its ultimate conclusion, that Mr. Smith did not satisfy the performance
prong of the Stricklandtest, is correct. The court's analysis in this case,
however, demonstrates a common error in reasoning in ineffective
assistance ofcounsel claims. The courtframed the issue as whetherit was
a reasonable tactical decision for Mr. Smith's trial counsel to rely on
cross-examination rather than defendant's own expert to counter the
Commonwealth's theory. This framing of the issue creates a false
dichotomy. Mr. Smith's trial counsel was not confronted with the
dilemma of choosing between cross-examination of the prosecution's
experts or introducing defendant's own expert. The decision was whether
to seek the appointment of defense experts at all. Thus, the real inquiry
for the court should have been whether it was a reasonable tactical
decision for Mr. Smith's trial counsel to rely solely on cross-examination
to counter the prosecution's experts. Withoutknowing defense counsel's
reason for not seeking the appointment of such experts, whether it was
due to ignorance or strategy, it is impossible to assess whether that
decision was a reasonable tactical one.
Trial counsel should take advantage of all available resources,
especially the appointment of expert assistance, in defending a capital
case. Under the rationale of Ake v. Oklahoma,2 7 a Supreme Court case
not cited by the court of appeals,2 8 a capital defendant has a due process
right to the appointment of an expert upon a showing that the expert is a
"basic tool" that is essential to the defense. 29 Assuming that Mr. Smith
would have been able to make such a showing, the prosecution's theory
that he shot Sgt. Conner in the back of the head with his .357 magnum
would have been significantly undermined.
The Commonwealth's first expert was Dr. Frances Field, an assistant medical examiner, with questionable qualifications as a ballistics
expert. 30 Dr. Field testified that she found powder residue in Sgt.
Conner's head wound thatwas consistent with a gunshot within three feet
for a revolver or six feet for a rifle. 31 She further stated that the blood
found on the barrel of Mr. Smith's .357 magnum was consistent with
"blow back" from a gunshot within four to six inches of Sgt. Conner's
head. 32 On cross-examination Dr. Field admitted that the blood on the
muzzle ofthe.357 magnum was not necessarily the result of"blow back"
and that the bullet that caused Sgt. Conner's back wound might have
ricocheted. 33 Compare Dr. Field's concession on cross-examination,
that the blood on the .357 magnum was not necessarily consistent with
"blow back", with the proffered testimony of Stewart James, a blood
24

Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d at 1132.
25 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
26 Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d at 1132-33 (emphasis added).
27 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
28 See Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d at 1132 (where the court cites
two Fourth Circuit cases for the proposition that an indigent defendant
has a right to assistance of an expert in certain circumstances but also
indicates that the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue).
29 See Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse Trial Manual, pp. 2953, on what is required to make an Ake showing.
30 The extent of her qualifications were that she had received
training in and read about the "distance ofweapons ... and the cause and
effect of wounds," and was usually allowed to testify about such things.
Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. at 257, 389 S.E.2d at 878.
31
Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d at 1131.
32Id.
33 Id.
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stain expert, on federal habeas. Mr. James concluded that the blood on
the .357 magnum could not have been "blow back."'34 The unequivocal
conclusion of Mr. James, a conclusion rendered by an expert more
clearly within his field of expertise, goes much further toward undermining the Commonwealth's theory regarding the .357 magnum than does
Dr. Field's equivocal concession on cross-examination.
The Commonwealth produced two other experts to substantiate its
theory regarding the .357 magnum. Julien Mason, a firearms identification expert, testified that the bullet abrasions on Smith's fence were
consistent with a .357 magnum. 35 Donald McClanrock, a forensic
scientist, testified that Mr. Smith had more barium gas on his left hand
than right hand, which was consistent with his having shot a revolver
with his left hand. On cross-examination, Mr. Smith's trial counsel was
able to get Mr. Mason to admit that the same bullet that caused the back
wound may have caused the head wound, that he found no gunpowder
residue in Sgt. Conner's head tissue, and that he could not determine
when the spent .357 casings had been fired. 36 Mr. McClanrock conceded on cross- examination that the gases on Mr. Smith's hand could
37
have come from the rifle.
Mr. Smith's trial counsel clearly obtained valuable concessions
from the prosecution experts. But again, consider how much more the
prosecution's theory would have been refuted by following crossexamination with expert testimony. On federal habeas, for example,
Gary Laughlin, a forensic microscopist and metallurgist, testified that
the metal fragments in the head wound could not have come from the
.357 magnum and that there was no powder residue in the head wound.
Dr. Vincent DiMaio, a forensic pathologist, stated that the head wound
was caused by the rifle and that it was fired from at least two or more feet
away. Finally, Lucien Haag, a firearms expert, concluded that there was
evidence that Mr. Smith did not fire the .357 at all that night and that the
bullet that wounded Mr. Smith's foot was more consistent with him not
38
facing Sgt. Conner when he was hit.
The testimony of experts would have substantially undermined
the prosecution theory, much more so than mere concessions on crossexamination. Moreover, it is quite likely that with the assistance of such
experts Mr. Smith's trial counsel could have elicited even more concessions from the prosecution's experts. Although the failure to seek the
appointment of such experts did notviolate Strickland,and so long as the
court continues to frame the Strickland inquiry to create a false dichotomy it probably never will, trial counsel should hesitate before
foregoing the defendant's due process right to expert assistance.
II. Federal Constitutional Claims Procedurally Barred
The district court found that Mr. Smith had procedurally defaulted
a number of his federal constitutional claims, apparently, because he
failed to file them along with his state constitutional claims on state
habeas. The court of appeals did not explicitly say that this was the

reason for default; further, there is no published district court decision
from which one can ascertain the reason. Nevertheless, Mr. Smith
claimed as "cause" for his default "his state habeas attorney's refusal to
present his federal claims, despite Smith's orders." 39 The court of
appeals acknowledged that "[i]t does appear that Smith's state habeas
counsel ignored Smith's requests to file federal constitutional claims
along with his state constitutional claims." 40 Moreover, the court of
appeals does not mention any other basis for defaulting Mr. Smith's
claims.
The court of appeals correctly rejected Mr. Smith's claim that his
state habeas attorney's refusal to present his federal constitutional claims
in state habeas constituted "cause." The United States Supreme Court, in
Coleman v. Thompson,4 1 directly answered Mr. Smith's contention when
it stated, "[b]ecause Coleman had no right to counsel to pursue his appeal
in state habeas, any attorney error that led to default of Coleman's claims
in state court cannot constitute cause to excuse the default in federal
43
habeas." 42 The court of appeals then, relying upon Slayton v. Parrigan
44
and Hawks v. Cox, made the following observation in a footnote:
Smith has not been denied review of [his federal constitutional] claims; rather, those claims have been fully reviewed on
direct appeal. Indeed, even if those claims had been pursued on
state habeas, they would almost certainly have been barred
because they had already been raised and rejected on direct
appeal, and Virginia bars repetitive review of identical issues
45
on habeas.
The court's reasoning, as to why Mr. Smith's claims are procedurally defaulted, goes as follows: Mr. Smith was procedurally barred from
raising his federal constitutional claims on federal habeas because he did
not include them in his state habeas petition. Mr. Smith was procedurally
barred from raising his federal claims on state habeas because those
claims were raised and rejected on the merits on direct appeal. Thus, to
follow the court's reasoning, Mr. Smith was barred from raising his
federal constitutional claims on federal habeas because they were raised
and rejected on the merits by the Virginia Supreme Court on direct appeal.
Not only does Slayton not stand for the proposition for which it is cited,
but the court's observation shows a lack of understanding about what is
meant by a procedural bar to federal habeas review. More importantly,
the court's observation indicates that Smith's federal constitutional
claims should not, in fact, have been procedurally barred from federal
review.
Slayton held that claims raised for the first time on state habeas, that
could have been but were not raised on direct appeal, cannot be raised on
state habeas. 46 Obviously that holding is completely irrelevant here
because, as the court noted, Mr. Smith's federal constitutional claims
were raised, reviewed, and rejected by the Virginia Supreme Court on
direct appeal. The Virginia Supreme Court in Hawks specifically held
that, absent changed circumstances, claims raised and decided on direct
appeal cannot be raised on state habeas. 47 In Turner v. Williams48 , the
court of appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained the difference between

34

Id. at 1132.
1d. at 1131.
36 Id.
37Id.
38
1d. at 1132n. 3. The court dismisses Mr.Haag'slatter conclusion
as being irrelevant because "the direction Smith was facing was not
pivotal to the prosecution's case." The evidence of course is relevant
because it corroborates Mr. Smith's testimony that he was turning to
walk back into his house when he "saw a 'flash' out of the comer of his
eye and felt something hit his right foot." Smith v. Commonwealth, 239
Va. at 252, 389 S.E.2d at 875. By corroborating this aspect of his
testimony, Mr. Smith's contention thathe fired only in response to being
fired upon is more believable than without such corroborative evidence.
35

39

Id.at 1133.
40 Id.
41 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
42
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757.
43 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974).
44 211 Va. 91, 175 S.E.2d 271 (1970).
45
Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d at 1133 n. 4.
46
Slayton, 215 Va. at 30, 205 S.E.2d at 682.
47
Hawks, 211 Va. at 95, 175 S.E.2d at 274.
48 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994).
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the Hawks rule and a true procedural default rule such as in Slayton. It
stated:
Slayton is a valid procedural default rule... Hawks, however,
is not a true procedural default rule; rather, it is more in the
nature of a collateral estoppel rule. Hawks cannot prevent
federal habeas review of federal constitutional claims properly
raised on direct appeal.... Thus, we must ascertain whether
Turner raised on direct appeal the aforementioned challenges
to the application of the vileness factor. If he did, he is not
49
procedurally barred from raising them here.
According to the observation by the court of appeals in its footnote,
that Smith's federal claims were raised and rejected on the merits by the
Virginia Supreme Court on direct appeal, it follows that the district court
was notprevented from reviewing Smith's federal constitutional claims.
Thus, while the court of appeals' conclusion that Smith's state habeas

counsel's errors could never constitute cause is correct, that conclusion
is as irrelevant as Slayton is to this case. As Turner makes clear, Mr.
Smith's federal constitutional claims cannotbe defaultedbyhis counsel's
failure to include them in his state habeas petition because those claims
had already been raised and rejected by the Virginia Supreme Court on
direct appeal.
It is difficult to decide what to recommend to habeas counsel in light
of the court's holding. On the one hand, the law does not require habeas
counsel, absent changed circumstances, to raise the same federal constitutional claims in state habeas that were raised and rejected on the merits
on direct appeal in order to preserve them for federal habeas review. On
the other hand, if a federal court does not understand that such claims do
not need to be raised on state habeas to be preserved it might mistakenly
find those claims to be procedurally defaulted for that very reason. In the
Fourth Circuit it is always best to be overly cautious and prepared to
explain to the court the crucial distinction between Slayton andHawks.
Summary and analysis by:
Tommy Barrett

49

Turner,35 F.3d at 890 (citing Ylstv. Nunnemaker,501 U.S. 797,
803-07 (1991)).

BECK v. COMMONWEALTH
253 Va. 373,484 S.E.2d 898 (1997)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Before the court, sitting without a jury, Christopher Beck pleaded
guilty to: (1) capital murder of his cousin Florence Marie Marks during
or subsequent to rape or in the commission of robbery while armed with
a deadly weapon; (2) capital murder ofWilliam Miller in the commission
of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon; (3) capital murder of
David Stuart Kaplan in the commission of robbery while armed with a
deadly weapon; (4) statutory burglary; (5) rape; (6) three offenses of
robbery; and (7) seven offenses of the use of a firearm. 1
The facts surrounding the murders are mainly drawn from statements Beck made to the police after his arrest.2 According to Beck, he

1Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 376, 484 S.E.2d 898, 900
(1997).
2
When the Arlington Police first interviewed Beck, he claimed that
at the time of the murders he was transporting bikes from Tennessee.
After a friend failed to corroborate Beck's story, Beck confessed to the
police that he had committed the three murders. Upon returning to
Arlington after his arrest, Beck gave a full statement to the police. While
making his statement, the police gave Beck an opportunity to say
something on his behalf. He said:
That ah Iknow what is like to kill somebody, its one of the
worst feelings you can live with that I don't know that it
is pretty painful that is one of the things that you can't go
to sleep and I'm so sorry that I did, I'm so sorry thatI had
all that anger built up, I should had went to a counselor or
something could have prevented it. I don't know, I'm
sorry but I know this is going to be pretty hard for people
to believe what happened. Id.at 378,484 S.E.2d 901-02.

devised a plan to kill Miller, his former employer, several days before the
murders actually occurred. 3 On June 5, 1995, Beck took a bus from his
home in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Washington, D.C. The next day,
at approximately 11 a.m., Beck arrived in Arlington and went to the
house shared by the three victims. He broke into the house through a
basement window. 4
After knocking a hole through to the first floor of the house, Beck
went to Miller's apartment and took a loaded .22 caliber semi-automatic
pistolbelongingto Miller. Beckloaded a sparemagazinefortheweapon,
and returned to the basement to wait for Miller.5
Sometime during the afternoon, Beck heard noises and realized
someone was coming into the basement. He raised the pistol, and as the
door opened, he closed his eyes and fired two shots. Upon opening his
eyes, Beck found his first victim, Florence Marks, lying on the basement
floor. According to Beck, he tried to make it look like Marks had been
raped by cutting off her clothes, stabbing her in the right buttock,
throwing a condom he had found in the washer onto the floor,kicking her,
and penetrating her vagina with a hammer.6 Beck reasoned that if the
police believed Marks had been raped, then they would think a stranger,
and not a family member, had murdered her.

3

Beck, 253 Va. at 376, 484 S.E.2d at 901.
1d. at 376-77, 484 S.E.2d at 901.
5
Id. at 377, 484 S.E.2d at 901.
6 Id. According to the testimony of the assistant chief medical
examiner, Marks' autopsy confirmed everything Beck said in his statement except Beck's remark regarding the "staged" rape. The Commonwealth presented evidence from the used condom found in the house,
asserting that genetic material of both Marks and Beck was found in the
condom. Id. at 378-79, 484 S.E.2d at 902.
4

